Seventy-five years have passed since Korea was divided into two, and the reunification of our country still looks like an unattainable task. In this difficult situation, I turn to Germany, which was in a similar position as Korea in the past. In 1945, after Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany was defeated in World War II, Germany was divided into East and West Germany. It took 28 years for the German reunification, and despite the relatively short period of division, the process of reunification and the after-effects after the reunification were significant. It is true that Korea is now in very different situation compared to Germany; however, I believe that there are some lessons we can learn from the history of German reunification.
The most significant thing that we can learn from the process of German reunification is that the unification policy remained constant even after regime changes shifted the political landscape from left to right. Before Willy Brandt took office as the Chancellor of West Germany, the reunification policy was based upon a ‘Policy of Strength.’ Under the Hallstein Doctrine, the West German government did not recognize East Germany and regarded the act of recognizing or maintaining diplomatic relations with it as an unfriendly act. In such a hostile atmosphere, the reunification of East and West Germany seemed unlikely. However, as Brandt began serving as Chancellor, the strained relations began to ease. He introduced a new reunification policy called Neue Ostpolitik (New Eastern Policy). He renounced the Hallstein Doctrine and actively engaged in diplomacy with various Eastern European countries. The Brandt government began its policy of reconciliation with East Germany and started to ceaselessly communicate and interact with each other.
Even after the Brandt’s resignation, Ostpolitik lasted for more than two decades, eventually thawing the Cold War between the East and the West, and finally saw it bear fruit when Germany reunified in 1990. How could Brandt’s policy be so successful? I believe that this was possible because there was an effort for reunification beyond party factions. Specifically, I reckon that Richard von Weizsäcker played a big role in the success of Ostpolitik. Weizsäcker, who had joined the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of Germany in 1954, was known for often publicly voicing political views different from his party line, both in and out of the presidential office. Even though he was in a party opposed to Brandt, he actively supported Brandt’s Ostpolitik. He urged his party to avoid blocking Brandt’s Ostpolitik entirely in the lower house. When his party tried to vote Brandt out of office with a vote of no confidence, Weizsäcker was only one of three CDU politician to speak out against the proposal.
As we can see, even though Brandt’s Ostpolitik was successful in the end, it may have failed without the support and the succession of policy by politicians in the opposing party. Indeed, reunification policies must be continued steadily, and only with efforts that transcend party factions can they succeed. I believe that politicians should not dwell on simply fighting over political power. Even when one’s party is different, one needs to actively support policies that take a long time and try to maintain it even when the regime changes, just as Weizsäcker did. It has now been 75 years since the division of the peninsula, but South Korea has not seen a single unification policy that continued through a regime change. To achieve reunification, I suggest that South Korean politicians should also work together on a bipartisan reunification policy like Germany.